Politicians
Introduction
In this paper we study politicians who a¤ect the allocation of …nance by choosing between state and private bank ownership, and by setting the level of investor protection. We investigate how these choices shape in ‡uence activities by special interests. Special interests are groups of citizens wanting to become entrepreneur and limit potential competition by seeking preferential access to …nance. To achieve this goal, politicians may either be bribed to allocate …nance directly through state banks, or lobbied for a level of investor protection that indirectly alters lending by private banks. Politicians trade o¤ these bribes and lobbying contributions against their political cost, which depends on public accountability and judicial independence.
1 Concretely, we set up the model such that the higher public accountability, the closer politicians'preferences are aligned with social welfare, which increases in entry and competition. Moreover, as public accountability and judicial independence become greater, the political and legal cost of bribes increase.
Interest groups are formed sequentially until no citizen gains by accepting to join or by leaving a group and no group can increase its pro…ts by changing its composition. Then each group makes an o¤er to the politician by asking for preferential access to …nance in exchange for bribes or lobbying contributions.
We …nd that politicians can extract greater private bene…ts under state ownership of banks, as direct control over …nance induces more competition among interest groups. Under private ownership of banks rich citizens, who need less external …nance, face less competition from lobbies of poorer couterparts.
The reason is that if the poor succeed in obtaining strong investor protection, the rich also have access to …nance without lobbying for it, but not viceversa. In contrast to private banks, state banks can fully fund any citizen, independent of wealth. Therefore, anyone can form a competitive interest group and politicians have more bargaining power.
Access to …nance and entry tend to be greater under private ownership of banks. When lobbying on investor protection citizens are only able to exclude poorer counterparts. Therefore, groups contain comparably wealthy citizens as to minimise free-riding, that is citizens having preferential access to …nance without having to lobby. It turns out that the rich lobby always wins and that it recruits additional (somewhat poorer) members to weaken competing interest groups. This e¤ect is absent under state ownership of banks.
Directing the allocation of …nance rather than regulating not only increases the ability of the politician to extract private bene…ts, but also exposes him to legal action. Consequently, increasing risk of legal and political sanctions …nally induces politicians to privatize banks despite a reduction in rents. Once banks are private, the allocation is in ‡uenced by legal lobbying on regulation, so there is no legal deterrance to accepting contributions. Hence, only politicians who are not too constrained by public opinion and the judiciary choose state ownership of banks, others prefer private ownership.
2
To justify our approach we refer to proof of interest groups in ‡uencing politicians to get preferential access to …nance. Moreover we cite work which shows that politicians are constrained by public accountability and judicial independence.
Evidence shows that interest groups lobby politicians to advance their own special interests (Olsen, 1965; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and that …rms may seek preferential access to …nance to keep potential entrants at bay (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . In line with these observations, political institutions which entrench the power of the elite tend to limit entry and competition (Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2007) .
The ability of politicians to favour special interests is constrained by their public accountability (Besley, Burgess and Prat, 2006) , as well as by judicial independence (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) . Greater public accountability, which re ‡ects the ability of citizens to question and challenge government policies, reduces the willingness of politicians to narrow …nancial access and limit competition in exchange for political contributions. The reason is that the associated reduction in social welfare has a higher political cost (e.g. risk of not being reelected or to be ejected by riots). Higher judicial independence makes politicians more reluctant to engage in illegal activities, such as taking bribes.
The paper o¤ers clear implications for state versus private ownership of banks in terms of legal and political institutions. State banks are more likely when public accountability and judicial independence are low, allow for greater extraction of rents by the politician and result in more constrained access to …nance. We provide support for these …ndings one by one.
3
Firstly, state ownership of banks is lower in countries with strong political systems, a better rule of law, less government repudiation of contracts and under common law (LLS, 2002; Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003) . Interestingly, common law countries on average have better investor protection and more judicial independence (LLSV, 1998; LLS, 2007) . Higher judicial independence, measured by the tenure and power of judges, is positively correlated with economic freedom and less state ownership of banks (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Pop-Eleches and Shleifer, 2004) . Secondly, allowing for direct control, state ownership of banks appears to lead to less e¢ cient …nancial allocation (LLS 2002) , with lending favouring politically connected …rms (Sapienza 2004; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Claessens, Feijen and Laeven 2007) . Connected …rms receive larger loans and pay comparable interest rates as similar unconnected …rms even though they are less likely to repay (Faccio, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) . Thirdly, there is proof that public accountability, which makes state ownership more likely, is also associated with more constrained access to …nance.
We cite evidence emphasising that lower public accountability reduces entry and increases the importance of connected lending for …rms. As such, both a stable democracy and free and widely accessible media stimulate …nancial development and entry (Bordo and Rousseau, 2006; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti and 3 The results apply more generally to other …nancial forms to allocate funding across …rms.
supporting entry has been associated with stronger political and su¤rage rights (Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2007) and less concentrated land ownership (Rajan and Ramcharan, 2007) . Finally, in countries with weak limits on the executive and high discretion of state o¢ cials, a political connection adds more to …rm value (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006) , with preferential access to …nance as one of the political favours (Khwaja and Mian 2005; Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2006 ).
Barriers to entry do not need to be …nancial access (although funding is fungible to overcome generic barriers). Politicians may limit entry directly by regulation and higher entry costs. This is consistent with the evidence that more corrupt countries have higher entry costs (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002) and less entry (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2004; Perotti and Volpin, 2007) .
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set up the model, in section 3 we derive the results and in section 4 we conclude.
Model set-up
Consider a closed economy with a population normalised to one. Its citizens spend their disposable income ! to consume numeraire and …nal goods. Any citizen can start a …rm that produces a single unit of …nal good by investing I, thus becoming entrepreneur. Potential …rm pro…ts can be used for consumption.
Every citizen i has a unique level of wealth w i , which is continuously distributed along interval [0; I].
As all citizens have wealth smaller than I, external …nance is crucial to start a …rm. We consider debt as the only source of external …nance. Therefore, the maximum number and size of bank loans determine the number of entrepreneurs. We denote the share of entrepreneurs (citizens that can raise I) by n, the remaining 1 n citizens only consume.
Under state ownership of banks S the politician can directly fund a group of citizens of his choice. Under private ownership of banks P the politician sets the level of investor protection 2 [0; 1] which parametrises the ability of …rms to credibly commit to repay a loan. By setting investor protection at , loan size is limited at I. As a result only citizens with wealth w e (1 ) I can become entrepreneur. When = 0 entry is zero and when = 1, entry is one.
Because every value of translates into a unique level of entry n the politician e¤ectively sets entry when choosing .
To sustain the price of the …nal good, potential entrepreneurs seek to limit entry n. They do so by forming groups (or coalitions) to overcome collective action problems and then collectively bribe and lobby the politician under S and P respectively.
In the remainder of this section we specify the players and welfare, the timeline, group formation and o¤ers and …nally bribing penalties.
Players and welfare
The model contains citizens, being either entrepreneur, consumer, or the single politician and representatives. 4 We denote initial investment by I, disposable income for consumption by !, entry by n, the price of the …nal good by p (n), social welfare by s (n) and political contributions through bribing or lobbying by r (n).
Every representative j forms a unique group (or set) of citizens Q j and is spokesman for that group at zero cost. Then they o¤er contributions r (n j ) in return for entry n j under both S and P . Representatives maximise the expected sum of pro…ts of their group's members
jQ j j e (n j ) if the o¤er by group j is accepted 0 otherwise (1) in which the modulus of Q j , or jQ j j, denotes the number of elements (citizens) in Q j , e (n j ) and e (n j ) denote pro…ts per …rm.
We assume that representative j can commit to paying r (n j ) after the politician has set entry at n j . Moreover we abstract from coordination problems within coalitions by assuming that each member pays an equal share of o¤ered
contributions.
An entrepreneur is a citizen who has been granted access to …nance and has a …rm. Every entrepreneur e competes on the …nal goods market and has pro…ts of e (n) = 8 < :
where r(n) n are the political contributions paid per entrepreneur in winning coalition Q j . Firm pro…ts are used for further consumption by entrepreneurs.
Citizens decide whether to seek external …nance and whether to accept requests to join interest groups. An average citizen i, consumer or entrepreneur, has utility from consumption
where k i and c i are the consumption of respectively the numeraire and …nal good while a is the strength of demand. 6 The average citizen's income is ! + n e (n)
such that the amount to be spent on the numeraire good is k i = ! + n e (n) c i p (n), which is also its utility.
Social welfare is de…ned as the aggregate utility of all citizens
De…ne m as the entry level for which e (m) = 0, such that pro…ts from (2) are zero. We will show that social welfare is increasing in n 2 [0; m] and maximised when n = m.
The politician chooses an o¤er containing entry n j and contributions r (n j )
by any group j or maximises social welfare. This results in the equilibrium 6 Disposable income is high enough to pay for consumption expenditure, i.e. ! (n S ; r S (n S )) or (n P ; r P (n P )) under state and private ownership of banks respectively. His utility is
where 2 [0; 1] denotes the level of public accountability and parameter K S represents the bribing penalties under S, which we explain in more detail later. 
Timeline
At t = 0 'nature' sets public accountability and judicial independence .
Citizens are endowed their disposable income ! and wealth w i .
At t = 1 the politician publicly chooses the …nancing mechanism, that is state bank ownership S with direct control or private ownership of banks P with regulation.
At t = 2 citizens decide whether or not to become active, that is to seek …nance to start a …rm.
At t = 3 representatives sequentially form groups of citizens. In turn, representatives request citizens to join their group. Every citizen can accept or decline a request.
At t = 4 the groups of citizens seek to get exclusive access to …nance. Under S citizens try to illegally bribe the politician in exchange for direct preferential access to …nance. Under P citizens seek to legally lobby for a favourable set of rules. Formally, group representatives convince the politician to set entry n S or n P in exchange for respectively r S (n S ) or r P (n P ).
At t = 5 the politician chooses the o¤er from t = 4 that maximises his utility or implements the social optimum (by allowing free entry). Citizens receiving …nance set up a …rm and produce one unit of …nal good.
At t = 6 the market for the …nal good is open and its price p (n) is determined. Consumers buy the …nal goods and political contributions are paid.
7 The politician's utility from opportunism is
which measures how much utility the politician derives from being bribed or lobbied to serve special interests instead of implementing the social optimum and have utility s (m).
Group formation and o¤ers
Under both mechanisms S and P , representatives j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg enter sequen- Sequentially, every representative forms a group in this way. New representatives form groups as long as the group generates positive expected pro…ts, i.e.
Qj > 0. An equilibrium coalition structure is Q = (Q 1 ; Q 2 ; :::; Q J ). Every group j o¤ers political contributions r j (n j ) 0 in exchange for entry n j leading to the contingent entry structure N = (n 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n J ) and contribution structure R = (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::; r J ).
An equilibrium group formation and accompanying political contributions (Q; R) must also be individually rational
and incentive compatible n j ; r j s.t. max nj ;rj Qj jn k ; r k 8k 6 = j
The o¤er of group j is chosen by the politician if it is individually rational (is better than implementing social welfare)
and incentive compatible (better than the o¤er of any other group k 6 = j)
The equilibrium level of entry and political contributions of (n S ; r S ) or (n P ; r P ) for S and P respectively satis…es (9), (10), (7) and (8) given Q.
Bribing penalties
In this last part of the model set-up we return to the bribing penalties K S in the politician's utility
apply under state ownership of banks, that is when the politician is bribed.
Citizens are maximally willing to spend n [p (n) I] on political contributions r (n) and the politician at least receives U p (m), conform (7) and (9) respectively. Therefore, the politician and representatives bargain over
Suppose that q 2 [0; 1] is the share of (n) captured by the politician.
Given q, we de…ne the expected bribing penalties as
Judicial independence 0 scales the expected punishment for illegal bribing.
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K S is increasing in , and q such that bribing penaties are lower when public accountability and judicial independence are low and the bribes itself are small.
Solving the model
We next discuss the product market equilibrium, the outcome of the group formation and subsequent bargaining process under both private and state ownership of banks, and the political choice for either state or private bank ownership.
Product market equilibrium
In this section we discuss the market of the …nal good given entry n and its implications for social welfare.
Proposition 1 Social welfare is maximised by allowing free entry or n = m, while entrepreneurs' income is maximised by limiting entry or n = 1 2 m.
Proof. Taking the …rst order condition of the citizens utility from (3) to c i yields individual consumption c i = a p (n). By equating total demand a p (n) to total supply n we …nd the price level p (n) = a n. As p (m) I = 0 we know that m = a I and that the income of all …rms together is n (m n), which decreases over n 2 1 2 m; m and is maximised at n = 1 2 m. Using (3), (4), p (n) = a n and c i = a p (n) social welfare becomes
which is increasing in entry n 2 [0; m] and maximised at n = m.
Higher production leads to higher per citizen consumption at a lower unit price. For citizens, this e¤ect outweights decreases in …rm pro…ts when production goes up. Therefore social welfare s (n) is maximised by allowing free entry, that is by setting n = m. On the other hand, total …rm income is maximised by limiting entry to n = 1 2 m. The trade-o¤ for politicians is clear: higher political contributions by reducing the availability of …nance or higher social welfare by increasing it.
State ownership of banks
Under state ownership of banks, group representatives try to bribe the politician to gain direct access to …nance for members of their group. When accepting a bribe, the politician incurs the expected bribing penalties K S .
Proposition 2 Under state ownership of banks S all groups have size n S = m 2 . Entry is n S and increases in public accountability .
Many overlapping groups make an o¤ er (n S ; r S ) to maximise the politician's utility. Each group has an equal chance of getting external …nance.
The politician gains less from being bribed the higher public accountability and judicial independence .
Proof. Loans of size I are granted under S such that all citizens are potential entrepreneurs.
We show in the appendix A that (i) the level of entry that maximises the politician's utility is n = m 2 .
(ii) the optimal group size is jQ j j = n j .
(iii) representatives need to make an o¤er (n j ; r j ) that maximises the utility of the politician to have a positive chance of winning, subject to their individual rationality constraint Qj 0. This o¤er has entry n j = m 2 and a share of surplus o¤ered to the politician q j = min
(iv) citizens accept all requests to join a group, such that representatives are able to form many 'optimal'groups.
(v) the utility from opportunism
Because (i)-(v) hold, the politician's and the representatives'individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints are satis…ed. Therefore the equilibrium level of entry is
The surplus (n) from (11) is divided between entrepreneurs and the politician.
The share appropriated by the politician is
Given that all the groups'o¤ers are exactly equal, the politician randomly picks one. Finally, we also show that @O S @ < 0 and
Under state ownership of banks the politician can channel …nance to any group of his choice, independent of the wealth of the groups'members. To have a chance of winning each group maximises the politician's utility subject to (7) by o¤erring a bribe of r S in exchange for entry n S . Because all groups have a positive probability of winning and joining an additional group does not a¤ect a citizen's expected pay-o¤ from another group, citizens join as many groups as possible. All the di¤erent groups have an equal chance of getting external …nance and starting a …rm.
We …nd that the higher public accountability ; the higher entry n S (closer to the social optimum n S = m) and the lower the remaining surplus (n S ).
The rents appropriated by the politician q S is 1 for to o¤set bribing penalties. Rents q S (n S ) and utility from opportunism O S = U S s (m) are decreasing in public accountability and judicial independence .
Private ownership of banks
Under private ownership of banks groups of citizens in ‡uence the politician's decision on investor protection . Given , only citizens with wealth w e
(1 ) I can become entrepreneur, i.e. entry is m.
Proposition 3 Under private ownership of banks the …rst group always wins by outbidding the second group. Other potential groups are irrelevant. Entry is
) m and increases in . Citizens accept to join only one group which is newly formed or contains the next richer citizen. This way citizens with comparable wealth end up in the same group, which reduces free-riding.
The politician gains less from being lobbied the higher public accountability .
Proof. In this proof we intuitively propose an outcome and show that it is an equilibrium.
Suppose that the …rst lobby, or rich lobby, contains the Q 1 most wealthy entrepreneurs and o¤ers (n 1 ; r 1 ). The second lobby, or the counterlobby, contains an optimal share of the remaining m Q 1 citizens and o¤ers (n 2 ; r 2 ) with n 2 = Q 1 + Q 2 . From (10), the rich lobby needs to o¤er
to outbid the counterlobby.
If equilibrium outcome n P satis…es n P = n 1 or n P = m, then e2Q2 = 0.
Therefore, citizens in Q 2 o¤er all their potential pro…ts to the politician, i.e. r 2 = (n 2 n 1 ) (m n 2 ) and maximise the RHS of (16). The optimal size of the counterlobby is then n 2 = m+n1(1 ) 2
. The rich lobby has to o¤er r 1 = r 2 + 1 [s (n 2 ) s (n 1 )] to ensure n P = n 1 . Given r 1 and n 2 , max n1 Q1 as in (1) yields entry of
with
To show that this is the equilibrium we prove in the appendix B that:
(i) the counterlobby is the biggest threat for the rich lobby:
These conditions make sure that by beating the counterlobby the individual rationality constraint in (9) and the incentive compatibility constraint in (10) are satis…ed. Moreover, lobby groups j > 2 are 'irrelevant'.
(ii) the the rich lobby prefers to outbid the counterlobby instead of free-riding on the counterlobby's o¤er:
Given the approach to derive n 1 and n 2 , this condition makes the …rst two lobby groups'o¤ers incentive compatible.
(iii) the individual rationality constraint of the coalitions, i.e. (7), is satis…ed:
[ e (n P = n 1 )] 0 (iv) there exists a strategy from which citizens do not want to deviate that results in the the rich lobby and counterlobby described above.
(v) the utility from opportunism O P = U P s (m) is nonnegative, conform (9). We also show that
Under private ownership of banks, the richest citizens join forces and lobby the politician for lower investor protection . This way they block entry for their poorer counterparts and ensure themselves of positive pro…ts. As this rich lobby can predict the countero¤er made by the remaining entrepreneurs, it just outbids that countero¤er and always wins. Secondly, the rich refuse to join the counterlobby as this increases the o¤er of the counterlobby, without increasing the rich'chance of winning. Because allocation of …nance is wealthbased, citizens make sure that those richer than themselves have also joined their group. This way they block the existence of richer non-members, who would have exclusive access to …nance without paying any political contributions, i.e.
be able to free-ride.
As under state ownership of banks, higher accountability aligns the politician's preferences closer to social welfare. As a result, entry n P increases and the utility from political rents (1 ) r P decreases. Therefore, the politician's utility from opportunism O P decreases in .
Concentrated private ownership of banks
Suppose that, in contrast to the competitive private banking sector analysed before, the politician can transfer bank control to the private sector in exchange for a bribe subject to bribing penalties as in (12). Given investor protection the acquirer directly allocates …nance, as the politician could under state ownership of banks S. If the politician sets investor protection high enough, citizens compete to maximise their chance of acquiring the bank sector by maximising the politician's utility. As a result the same outcome as under S, or (n S ; r S ), is obtained.
In this setting both state and concentrated private ownership result in the same level of entry n S and political rents r S . Moreover, the bank owner's rents from banking are zero. In what follows we treat concentrated private ownership and state ownership the same and refer to it as state ownership S.
Comparing private and state ownership of banks
In this section entry n, total revenues n (m n), total net pro…ts e and the politician's utility U p are compared in the two governance systems S and P .
We …nd that entry, or the size of the winning group, is lower under state bank ownership S than under private bank ownership P . 10 As a result of lower entry, total revenues are higher under S. In principle the politician prefers S to P , because larger discretion in allocating …nance under S allows extraction of larger political rents. However, higher judicial independence increases bribing penalties and can therefore reverse this preference. In all graphs solid lines refer to P and dashed lines to S.
Entry
Proposition 4 Entry is lower under state than under private ownership of banks for public accountability 2 [0; 1) and equal for = 1.
Proof. n S n P , (2 ) 1 for 2 [0; 1]. Public Accountability Share wealthy entrepreneurs that enters P S As shown before, entry n increases in under both S and P . It lies between n S = 1 2 m for = 0 where total …rm income is maximised, and n P = n S = m for = 1 where the social optimum is implemented.
Depicting entry shares
Under S, two competitive disjoint groups can be formed which set the size of their group Q j , entry n j and political contributions r j to maximise O p . This way they maximise their chance of winning. Under P , citizens can only exclude citizens poorer than themselves and join only a single group containing others with comparable wealth to avoid free-riding. Because of this exclusive membership, the rich lobby weakens competition from other groups by increasing its size (thus decreasing the size of the conterlobby). As a result, groups are larger and entry is higher under P than under S.
Firms'total income
Proposition 5 For 2 [0; 1), …rms' total income is higher under state than private ownership of banks and decreases in .
Total income is depicted below after division by constant m 2 . (1 )( 2 1) 2 (2 ) under S and are P = n P e (n P ) =
Increasing judicial independence leads to lower bribes r S . Therefore, profits S are increasing in such that S < P for low and S > P for high . Depicted are S and P for = 8, divided by m 2 . Under P , the higher , the lower income, political contributions r P and pro…ts P .
Politician' s utility
The politician chooses the governance system that results in the highest utility.
To focus on lobbying and bribing we use the gains from opportunism O p , which constitute an a¢ ne transformation of U p .
Proposition 7 Private ownership becomes more likely the higher . The politician prefers state ownership of banks as long as <
2 .
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Graphing O S and O P divided by constant m 2 for = 8 yields 
Non-repayment of loans under state ownership
In the baseline model state bank loans were always repaid in full. This need not be the case. Politicians and entrepreneurs could strike a deal in which the entrepreneur does not repay part of the loan in exchange for an additional bribe.
Under state ownership of banks with potential non-repayment S 0 total …rm debt is nI. To …nd an equilibrium we need to know ( (12), or x ( vxnI).
As a result of non-repayment, state banks will run a de…cit vnI.
Suppose that state banks raise the amount required to …nance free entry, mI, by taking on matching liabilities. Suppose that a given percentage of these liabilities is guaranteed by the government through taxation of citizens.
We assume that 2 0; 1 2 such that state banks fail when nothing is repaid, even when entry is minimal at n = 1 2 m and total debt is 1 2 mI. De…cit vnI is covered by the government whenever possible, but if more than mI is not repaid state banks fail. Then the politician su¤ers an additional damage of f ( ; ; I) 0. (i) Given v, it is optimal for interest groups to o¤er x S 0 = min
which is equal to q S = q S 0 .
(ii) Banks fail when vnI > mI , v > m n . It is optimal for the politician to set v = m n < 1 to extract maximum rents without triggering a bank failure or to set v = 1 and let banks collapse. When the politician and entrepreneurs can negotiate (partial) non-repayment of state bank loans a share of loans will not be repaid. This share is nonincreasing over public accountability and is divided between the politician and entrepreneurs. The latter are able to capture a larger percentage of the nonrepaid amount when public accountability and judicial independence are high.
1 5 Groups of citizens maximise the politician's utility to maximise their chance of winning.
Moreover, the value for q S 0 = q S = min n 1; 1 2 o and the proof for jQ j j = n j remain the same.
Moreover, the likelihood that too little is repaid for banks to remain solvent is decreasing in public accountability and the damage of bank failures to politicians.
Finally, given that the politician negotiates at least a partial non-repayment when he can, the possibility to do so under state ownership of banks makes private ownership less likely.
Conclusion
This paper investigates a politician's choice for either state or private ownership of banks in terms of public accountability and judicial independence. We study how this choice a¤ects in ‡uence activities by special interests that o¤er the politician private bene…ts in exchange for exclusive access to …nance. In state banks, politicians are bribed to direclty alter loan decisions, while politicians are lobbied to indirectly change the allocation of …nance of private banks via their regulatory environment. We show that this di¤erence can substantially a¤ect the formation of interest groups, the allocation of …nance and competition on the …nal goods market.
Abuse of political power is constrained by the ability of consumers to question and challenge state action, i.e. public accountability. Under state ownership of banks, this abuse is further reduced by higher judicial independence. We …nd that state ownership of banks is less likely in countries with higher public accountability and judicial independence. The risk of legal enforcement is essential to induce politicians to privatize banks.
The paper presumes that political decisions on control over the …nancial system shape in ‡uence seeking by private parties. The approach suggests some novel empirical implications. Since legal independence and accountability are positively correlated, the empirical e¤ect of judicial independence on state ownership of banks should be higher at low levels of political accountability. Secondly, independently of bank ownership, …nancial access should be broader in countries with stronger democratic rights and a more free and more di¤used press. A novel political economy result is that direct control over the allocation of …nance allows for greater extraction of rents by politicians than being lobbied to set weak investor protection rules. The reason is that …nancial rules regulating access create a free riding advantage for richer lobbies, reducing competition among interest groups relative to the case of direct political control. This broad proposition is in principle testable, although precise empirical measurement of political rents is objectively di¢ cult.
The approach may be completed and extended in various directions. A question we do not address directly is what is the impact of political and legal institutions to the stock of funding available. Since North and Weingast (1989) and LLSV (1998), we know that …nancial market development depends on minimum political and legal guarantees for investors. The approach also applies natural to study politically induced …nancial instability (for a …rst approach, see Feijen and Perotti, 2006) and the e¤ect of concentrated approach to funding on innovation.
A. Equilibrium under state ownership of banks (i) Maximising the politician's utility Maximising U p from (5) given (11) and (12) over n and q yields:
with (ii) the optimal group size is jQ j j = n j If jQ j j < n j , n j jQ j j entrepreneurs free-ride on the o¤er of representative j. Group pro…ts are Qj = jQ j j (m n j ) r j with @ Q j @jQj j > 0. Representative j wants to enlarge Q j and even the i 2 n j Q j free-riders join, because there exists a group of citizens i 0 6 2 n j Q j who will otherwise.
If jQ j j > n j ; Qj = n j (m n j ) r j , such that the representative has no incentive to enlarge his group beyond n j .
(iii) representatives maximise the politician's utility to have a positive chance of winning, subject to Qj 0
For these disjoint groups j and h it holds that if n S = Q j ! e2Q h = 0. As a result, representative h is willing to spend any potential pro…ts on bribes to convince the politician. The reverse holds for representative j if n S = Q h . Thus, any group k = j; h tries to outbid the other by maximising (5) subject to (7).
Each o¤er made to politicians has n j = n S and r j = r S = 1 [s (m) s (n S )]+ q S (n S ), such that expected pro…ts are as in (1) with
and are thus nonnegative. As a result, the representatives set up the groups and the citizens accept to be member as e2Q k > 0.
If n j 6 = n S or r j 6 = r S group j either does not win such that E [ e (n j )] = 0 or wins and has E [ e (n j )] < 0 (when < 1 2 and q > 1).
(iv) citizens accept all requests to join a group.
All groups are of equal size and have equal pro…ts if chosen, independent of whether its members join competing groups. Therefore, joining an additional group simply increases the probability of winning.
(v) the utility from opportunism O S is nonnegative.
The political rents from opportunism are found by substituting (5), (11), (12) and (13) in (6) yielding
(1 ) (1 ) (n S ) if . Moreover, taking derivatives yields 
The counterlobby thus makes an o¤er superior to the social optimum.
The politician's utility from o¤er (n j ; r j ) with r j = n j (m n j ) is
Taking a derivative yields
i.e. representatives j > 2 never win.
(ii) the the rich lobby prefers to outbid the counterlobby instead of free-riding on its o¤ er We substitute n 1 in r 1 and get
, the rich prefer outbidding the poor to letting the counterlobby win and free-ride.
(iii) the individual rationality constraint of the members of both lobbies are satis…ed From point (ii) and knowing that [ e6 2Q1 jn P = n 1 ] = 0 we conclude that e (n P = n 1 ) 0.
(iv) the citizens' strategy Group formation resulting in the rich lobby and the counterlobby is achieved by the strategy: citizen i 2 Q j if (a) group j is new and w i > w f 6 =i 8f 6 2 Q j 0 6 =j or (a') group j already exists and w i 1 2 Q j , 16 and if (b) i 6 2 Q j 0 6 =j . The …rst representative starts by requesting the richest citizen i = 1 to join his group 17 , who accepts as (a) and (b) are satis…ed. Then the …rst representative expands his group by sequentially adding poorer citizens until it has size jQ 1 j. These poorer citizens accept to join as (a') and (b) are satis…ed. Then, the second representative forms the counterlobby in the same way, starting with the richest remaining citizen i = jQ 1 j + 1.
By maximising (1) we found Q 1 and Q 2 which are thus optimal for the representatives. We now show that citizens have no incentive to deviate from the strategy given above.
(a) If citizen 1 6 2 Q 1 , the group formation collapses and n P = m , 16 2Q1 = 0. Given that, 12Q1 = 1 2
(1 )(2 ) 1+(1 )(2 ) m 0 ! 1 2 Q 1 . If citizen jQ 1 j + 1 6 2 Q 2 , the formation of the counterlobby collapses and the rich lobby decreases its o¤er to n 1 and r 1 = 1 [s (m) s (n 1 )] as in (9). In this case 9n 2 ; r 2 ; " ! U p (n 2 ) > U p (n 1 ) for which Q1+12Q2 = m " > Q1+16 2Q2 = 0 ! jQ 1 j + 1 2 Q 2 .
(a') A rich citizen i can potentially free-ride by not joining the rich lobby and waiting for it to win. This way she can potentially become entrepreneur without paying r1 n1 . However, by refusing to join a group the expansion of that group is halted as for any next citizen i 0 > i : w i 0 1 6 2 Q j . This implies that either the politician sets n P = n 1 = jQ 1 j with i 6 2 Q 1 or n P = m such that i2Q1 > i6 2Q1 = 0. Another option is for citizen i 2 Q j when w i < w f 6 =i 8f 6 2 Q j 0 6 =j . This is suboptimal as it allows free-riding by citizens f . In that case entry and income remain n j and m n j respectively while rj jQj j increases. (b) Joining a second lobby increases the strength of competition.
18 Take an enterprise's relative size to the total market as " > 0. For groups j 2 rent payments are r j = (n j n 1 + ") (m n j ) and size is jQ j j = n j + " =
(1 )n1+m+" 2
. As a result of joining r j 2 has increased.
(v) the utility from opportunism O P is nonnegative, conform (9).
The utility from opportunism is found by substituting (17) in (6) such that The politician's utility from setting v = 1 and letting banks fail is
Maximising this to q, x and n subject to (7) yields q = x = min n 1; and is positive, continuous and decreasing over . Therefore there is a level below which politicians set v = 1 and let banks fail and above which v = m n and banks survive.
